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Abstract
In this paper, we use a Moore Automata with Binary Stochastic Output Function in order
to explore the extensive decision regarding tax evasion made by subjects in experiments run in
Chile and Italy. Firstly, we show how an hypothesis about subject behavior is converted into an
automaton, and how we compute the probabilities of evading for every state of an automaton.
We use this procedure in order to look for the automaton which is able to anticipate the highest
number of decisions made by the subjects during the experiments. Finally, we show that automata
with few states perform better than automata with many states, and that the bomb-crater e®ect
described in [1] is a well identi¯ed pattern of behavior in a subset of subjects.
1 Introduction
"As economists we are confronted with a choice between waiting for a satisfactory description of
the procedure of human decision making and analyzing somewhat arti¯cial models capturing certain
elements of `bounded rationality'" Ariel Rubinstein [2] [p.83]
In this paper we use the theory of ¯nite automata starting from a set of behavioral data collected
in two set of experiments on tax evasion run in Italy and in Chile.
The neoclassical theory of tax evasion [3] [4] is based on the assumption of a traditional full rational
agent who decides her level of tax compliance accordingly with a standard process of expected utility
maximization. This theoretical approach has been widely criticized mainly moving from an experi-
mental empirical ground. The extraordinary wide latitude of the experimental economics literature
in this ¯eld makes impossible to summarize here the richness of the empirical ¯ndings (for a recent
survey see Eric Kirchler [5]).
In extreme synthesis one could say that the standard theory fails to account in predicting the
agents' reactions induced by the standard parameters of the decisional problem - a typical example
of this kind is the weakness of the theory in explaining the tax payers reactions to an increase in the
tax rate -. Moreover the standard theory is inadequate in forecasting the tax payers' response to the
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1inclusion of psychological factors in the task problem - e.g. including a social blame e®ect or other
forms of psychological constraint -.
Some quite recent attempts to overcome the limits of the standard approach to tax evasion have
been carried out by substituting the Expected Utility Maximization Theory (EUMT) with the Prospect
Theory (PT) by Kahneman and Tversky [6]. In spite of its behavioral foundations the Prospect Theory
still belongs to the class of theories based on a perfectly rational agent. The only apparent concession to
bounded rationality in the theoretical machinery of PT is limited to the allowance of some inconsistency
in the risk attitudes. The PT agent re-models her risk attitude accordingly with a reference point which
works as a psychological dividing wall between risk aversion and risk propensity.
The psychological-behavioral foundations of PT can help in explaining the tax payers' inconstancy
reported by many repeated choices experiments but is still unable to forecast in a satisfactory way the
full complexity of the factors that can a®ect the decisional process. This is clearly a paradox: from
one side both the two most important among the general parsimonious theories applied to tax evasion
fail to take into account the complexity of the decisional process and from the other side these theories
are grounded on a substantially perfectly rational agent who does not exist in the real world.
The attempt carried out in this paper is to go into the opposite direction. We assume an agent
who is strongly rationally bounded, even more limited than the real agents are, but at the same time
we use a quite sophisticate analytical approach to model her behavior.
Using ¯nite automata for explaining human decision making, is equivalent to say that participants'
decisions depend on their current conditions or state. An individual has di®erent states and she
changes from one state to another according to external events. This idea closely resembles the
original Simonian de¯nition of bounded rational agent. To decide accordingly to a bounded \local"
set of information implies the discard of the standard view of a perfectly rational optimizing homo
economicus. If an individual has evaded but she was not audited she might be less willing to evade the
next time than a subject who has been audited and punished. It is worth noticing that this shifting of
the agent's attitude towards evasion due to past experiences is not compatible with a standard view of
perfect rationality. What has happened in the previous round should not a®ect the tax payer decision
process because if she would be perfectly rational then she has had already computed all her future
choices. More precisely the perfectly rational tax payer chooses on the basis of a general probabilistic
inter-temporal plan built on a complete preference mapping of all the possible alternative probabilistic
weighted outcomes. Contrary to this picture, in our setting, we assume that the probability of evading
depends on the current subjective state of the tax payer who is determined by the local status quo.
The idea that ¯nite automata theory may be useful for modeling human making decision is not
new. The just quoted Rubinstein originally developed a research agenda where automaton was used
for modeling bounded rationality and Romera [7] uses ¯nite automata to represent mental models.
2Another similar view of a locally determined decision maker which is closer to our theoretical
design is suggested by Selten [8]. In his Aspiration Adaptation Theory the Seltenian agent chooses
her actions by considering a limited set of decisional dimensions (the aspiration level) described by
discrete scales of measure which are determined by the speci¯c local state of nature. The same agent
can choose opposite actions depending from the local bond of a dynamically adaptive network of
aspirations described in a discrete ¯nite set of alternatives. Moving from one bond to another means
changing from an aspiration level to another without having a complete picture of the whole set of
aspirations. In this sense we can imagine a possible (extreme) adaptation of the Aspiration Adaptation
Theory to our approach. In our setting the relevant dimensions of choice in the tax payer problem is
represented by the two states \has been audited", \has not been audited" and the tax payer decides
only accordingly to the characteristic of her current state.
It is worth noticing that the Aspiration Adaptation Theory applies very well as a general descriptive
tool for modeling the tax payer behavior and can also been applied to the experimental design used
here. An aspiration level in Selten's de¯nition can be described as a vector a = (a1;;am) where aj
is the partial aspiration level for a generic Gj goal. A goal for a tax payer could be the amount of
income "saved" from taxes or the psychological cost implied by the decision to evade due to social
blame. In the theoretical setting of the Adaptation Aspiration Theory the tax payer should move
from an aspiration level to another accordingly with the starting point and using a sort of backward
looking logic that pushes her from one local aspiration level to another one. The choice of the new
aspiration level depends on the local informational bundle which in our example could be represented
by the amount of disposable income, the value attributed to the moral constraints, etc. An exhaustive
description of an aspiration level applied to tax evasion goes beyond our aims so what we shall take
from the Adaptation Aspiration Theory is more a methodological hint than a complete theoretical
frame.
Our model does not explain the full process of rationing made by the agent before of making the
decision. Instead of this, we characterize the states where the subjects are more willing to evade or
not. The willingness to evade will be represented as a probability.
We use a type of ¯nite automaton named Moore machine. This machine consist of a ¯nite set of
states, one of them includes an initial state, an output function and a transition function. We partially
modify the output function; instead of depending only on the current state, the decision of evading or
not depends on the current state and its related probability of evasion.
As the number of states of the machine increases, we obtain a better explanation of the subjects
behavior. However, in this case we obtain automata with a high number of states. These type of
automata do not produce useful theory for explaining subjects decisions. Therefore, we want to model
the behavior of the agents with the lowest level of complexity. Having a simple automaton allows us to
3have good explanation of subject decisions. Although several measures of complexity for the automata
have been suggested in the literature (See [2]), we will use a fairly naive de¯nition of complexity: what
counts is the number of states in the machine.
Our main conclusion is that taking into account the extensive decision on evasion made by the
subjects, we distinguish two patterns of behaviors: on the one hand there is a group of individuals
who behave honestly, paying all their taxes all the time. On the other hand we con¯rm the relevance
of the so called "bomb crater e®ect" [1] which predicts that individuals are more willing to evade right
after being audited (see section 3).
In the next section we will formalize the Moore Automata with Binary Stochastic Output Function
for capturing the subjects behaviors. After the formalization we show two methods for estimating the
probabilities in every state: ¯rst we use di®erent probabilities for discriminating the subjects behavior
during the experiments run in Chile and Italy. Second, we optimize the probabilities for explaining
only with one automaton the behavior of all the subjects in a given experiment. After this, we conclude
describing the results and future work to be done.
2 The Moore Automata with Binary Stochastic Output Func-
tion
In the theory of computation, a Moore machine is a ¯nite state automaton where the outputs are
determined only by the current state and does not depend directly on the input. The standard state
diagram for a Moore machine includes a deterministic output signal for each state.
We introduce a variation in the output function of the Moore automata: instead of producing a
deterministic output signal, the output function can produce either of two values 0 or 1. Every state
s has a probability ps of producing a 1 and a probability (1 ¡ ps) of producing a 0.
Thus, the Moore machine with a binary stochastic output function can be de¯ned as a 7-tuple
¡ = fS;S0;P;§;¤;T;Gg consisting of the following objects:
² a ¯nite set of states ( S ),
² a start state (also called initial state) S0 which is an element of (S),
² a set of probability values ( P ). Every state s 2 S has a probability ps 2 P. The initial state
has a probability pS0 2 P. The numerosity of the set P is equal to the numerosity of S plus 1,
i.e. the initial state,
² a ¯nite set called the input alphabet ( § ),
² a ¯nite set called the output alphabet ( ¤ = f0;1g),
4² a transition function (T : S £ § ! S) mapping a state and an input to the next state




1; if ² < ps;
0; otherwise.
(1)
where ² is a uniform random number between 0 and 1.
This automaton produces a binary string of 0 and 1 according to the visited state and the probability
of that state. Each 1 and 0 is the prediction made by the automaton about the subject decision for the
next period. If the probabilities of all the states is 0.5, the automaton will produce a random string of
1's and 0's.
The design chosen for our automata is quite close to the Selten's idea of dynamically adaptive
aspiration plans. Our automata agent can be described as a decision maker who chooses her actions
accordingly with a given aspiration level. In our model the local dependence of the aspiration level is
mimicked by the probability state. In Selten's Theory probability has no role because the Seltenian
decision maker is fully deterministic but our concept of local probability must be interpreted here as a
way to de¯ne the subjective dimension of the aspiration plans. More precisely the transition function,
combined with the output function (which incorporates the state probability), describes the decision
making process which drives our automata from one bond to another of the decisional network. It is
worth noticing that the states of our automata can be interpreted as aspiration levels.
3 Data from the Experiments: extensive and intensive deci-
sions
The experiments discussed in this work have been carried out using an identical experimental design -
software, instructions, payo®s structure - in Italy at the CEEL laboratory of the Trento University and
in Chile at Northern Catholic University. The experimental design has been originally developed in a
previous work by [1] and the Italian data here reported have been extracted from the same paper. The
baseline experiment is based on a repeated choices setting. Two alternative treatments of the baseline
experiment are here reported as well. Treatment one introduces a mechanism of redistribution of
the tax yield among the participants while treatment two uses the tax yield collected to ¯nance the
production of a public good which is consumed outside the strict group of the participants. The
hypothesis tested with treatment one and treatment two is that sentiments of other regarding can
contrast tax evasion ceteris paribus. The baseline session as well as the treatments sessions have been
run using a computer-aided game. Thirty undergraduate students participated in each session, 15 men
and 15 women. All the experiments were of the same length (60 rounds). The parameters entered in
5the experiment are the followings:
² income - 0,51 Euro cents from round 1 until round 48, then 0.36 Euro cents;
² tax rate - 20 from round 1 until round 10, then 30 from round 11 until round 30, and ¯nally 40
from round 31 until the end;
² tax audit probability - 6 from round 1 until round 21, then 10 from round 22 until round 40, and
¯nally 15 from round 41 until the end;
² fees - the amount of the tax evaded plus a fee equal to the tax evaded multiplied by 4.5; the tax
audit had e®ect over the current round and the previous three rounds.
To approximate a real life situation more closely, the tax audit was extended over a period of
four rounds in the base experiment. For this reason, and as the lottery structure changed during the
experiment, computation of the expected value from evasion was rather complex. The lottery structure
for the experiment was always unfair which means that a risk neutral tax payer should always pay the
entire amount of tax due. (see [1] for the details) The experimental subjects have recruited either in
Italy and in Chile through announcements on bulletin boards. During the experiment the players were
kept separated so that they cannot communicate in any way. The relevant pieces of information have
been communicated only via the computer screen, which showed the following items:
1. the total net income earned by the player since the beginning of the game,
2. gross income in the active round,
3. the amount of taxes to pay in the active round,
4. the number of the active round.
The subjects were divided into two groups, and they underwent a ¯scal audit in the same rounds
(speci¯cally rounds 13, 31, 34, 48, 54, 58 for the ¯rst group, and rounds 3, 24, 27, 40, 46, 50 for the
second group). The two sequences have been randomly extracted accordingly with the rules of the
design (i.e. using the probability values corresponding to each of the three sub periods of the game).
The changes in the audit probability have been communicated to the participants with a warning
on the computer screen which informed them that the audit probability would change after three
rounds. Each participant every round must write, using the computer keyboard, the amount of money
that she has decided to pay and then she must wait for being informed on the result of the audit
extraction. In the following section a brief overview of the data obtained from both the Italian and
Chilean experiments is reported. The main result is that the behavioral patterns into the two countries
are very similar and in particular the so called "bomb crater e®ect" [1] Kirchler et al. appears as a
robust phenomenon in all the samples.
6For the sake of making easier the reference below, we denote the set of experiments for Chile and
Italy by ¥ = fec1;ec2:::;ec6;ei1;ei2:::;ei6g. Experiments ec1 y ei1 are two experiments with the same
experimental design, but they di®er because the former was run with chileans subjects whereas the
second with italians one. Thus the experiments are
ec1;ei1 : baseline experiment with group 1 for Chile and Italy.
ec2;ei2 : baseline experiment with group 2 for Chile and Italy.
ec3;ei3 : mechanism of redistribution of the tax yield with group 1 for Chile and Italy.
ec4;ei4 : mechanism of redistribution of the tax yield with group 2 for Chile and Italy.
ec5;ei5 : tax yield to ¯nance the production of a public good with group 1 for Chile and Italy.
ec6;ei6 : tax yield to ¯nance the production of a public good with group 2 for Chile and Italy.
In every experiment e¢ are 15 subjects. Each of the 180 subjects in ¥ made decision on the amount
of payment during 60 periods. Thus, any agent j has produced a history of 60 decisions. We are
interested only on the extensive decision of evading. If evasion is represented with a 1, and not evasion
with a 0, the decisions made by an agent j in an experiment, can be represented by a binary string hj
of size 60.
3.1 The case of Chile
Looking at the extensive decision made by the subjects, in Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 we plot the number
of subjects deciding to evade in every period for the experiments made in Chile and Italy. In the
horizontal axis there are the periods of the experiment, and in the vertical axis the number of subjects
who decide to evade. The vertical bars represent the periods where all the subjects were audited.
Notice that the di®erence between the group 1 and 2 is on the distribution of controls. In the group
2, the sequence of controls is shifted toward the beginning of the experiments.





e(c,1) − Mean of Evasors: 4.58





e(c,3) − Mean of Evasors: 6.32





e(c,5) − Mean of Evasors: 7.17
Figure 1: Extensive Decisions for Group 1 in Chile
7There are some characteristics which are important to point out for the cases of Chile. In the
¯rst experiment, with the ¯rst group in Figure 1 there is an greater number of subjects evading after
the government control. This seems to con¯rm the bomb crater e®ect. However, in the other two
experiments for the ¯rst group, the e®ect is unclear: sometimes there are less evaders and occasionally
more evaders after a control.
For the second group, in Figure 2 it is di±cult to anticipate a clear aggregate patter of behavior.
Looking at the average number of evaders, there is more evasion in the second group than in the ¯rst
group.
In all the cases, there is no event that coordinate all the subjects for evading or not. In the
population of 15 subjects, the changes on the decision of evading or not from one period to the other
was never greater than 5. Moreover, in every period in all the experiments there were at least 3 subjects
evading.





e(c,2) − Mean of Evasors: 7.48





e(c,4) − Mean of Evasors: 8.12





e(c,6) − Mean of Evasors: 5.78
Figure 2: Extensive Decisions for Group 2 in Chile
3.2 The case of Italy
Looking at the number of evaders in every period for the experiments in Italy, the ¯rst group shows more
irregular patterns than the chilenean case. In another words, it seems to be that italians sometimes
coordinates to make the same decision.
In experiment 1 and 3 there is an stable number of evaders at the beginning. However the redis-
tribution experiment, produces high variability of evaders at the beginning.
The average number of evaders in all the experiments is lower for the second experiment. The
induced e®ect of the public good has produced a reduction of evaders in the italian case.
For the case of Italy and Chile we can observe that on the aggregate data, it is di±cult to observe
the existence of the bomb crater e®ect. In what follow we will show that in aggregate this e®ect is





e(i,1) − Mean of Evasors: 8.37





e(i,3) − Mean of Evasors: 4.58





e(i,5) − Mean of Evasors: 7.05
Figure 3: Extensive Decisions for Group 1 in Italy





e(i,2) − Mean of Evasors: 7.48





e(i,4) − Mean of Evasors: 3.73





e(i,6) − Mean of Evasors: 4.58
Figure 4: Extensive Decisions for Group 2 in Italy
indistinguishable because not all the subjects behave according to that e®ect.
4 Using automata for characterizing subject behaviors
In this section we search for an automaton or a set of automata for making the best prediction of the
decision of evading of the subjects in the experiments.
We distinguish two possible strategies for accomplishing such a goal: ¯rst a computationally inten-
sive strategy, and second the strategy of searching for the minimum set of automata explaining a high
proportion of subject behaviors.
The computationally intensive strategy is to build an automaton for each subject in every experi-
ment1. Each of these automata could have sixty states, one for each period of time.
1We have data from two countries. In every country we ran three experiments, and in every experiment there are
two groups with ¯fteen subject each. This would mean that our theory had 2 ¤ 3 ¤ 2 ¤ 15 = 180 automata.
9Although the computational intensive strategy provides good prediction on subject behaviors, it
does not give us any useful abstraction for a theory on ¯scal evasion behavior. Epistemological and
ontological parsimony is a basic requirement to make such a contribution. The construction of 180
automata does not provide good insight to pursue this goal.
The second strategy, searching for a set of minimum automata for explaining the highest proportion
of subject behavior, is more challenging and eventually give us the chance of making theory about
subject behavior on tax evasion.
In this strategy we search for a set of automata, (ideally only one automaton) with the highest
success rate at predicting the extensive behavior of all the subjects in a given experiment.
4.1 Computing the success rate of a set of automata
This procedure explains how do we obtain the number of states of an automaton, how do we compute
the probability of evading in every state and ¯nally how do we compute the success ratio of the
automaton.
1. We start with an hypothesis H about the behavior of the subjects in a given experiment e¢ 2 ¥,
2. we transform the hypothesis into a ¯nite automaton ¡H. The hypothesis determines the number
of states n of the automaton,
3. for any single subject j we compute a vector of visited states Vj. The visited state vector Vj is
a (n £ 1) vector where every position Vj(i) for i = 1::n is the number of times that the agent j
visited the state i in his history hj.
4. for every subject j we compute the vector of evasions Ej. This vector is a (n £ 1) vector where
the position Ej(i) for i = 1::n count how many times the subject j evaded after of being in the
state i in hj.
Thus, if an hypothesis produces an automaton with 8 states, and a given agent j has Vj(3) = 5
and Ej(3) = 0 it means that the agent j was in the state 3 ¯ve times and she never evaded in
that state.




Vj(i); if Vj(i) > 0;
0; otherwise.
for i = 1::n (2)
Thus for every agent j we have a vector ¦j showing what is the empirical probability of evading
for the agent j given that he is in an state i with 0 < i · n.
106. we use the vector ¦j of all the agents in a given experiment to create a set of K clusters. Each
one of this cluster represents a group of subjects with similar vector ¦ of probabilities of evading
in each states. The clusters create a partition of subjects ­ = f!1;:::;!Kg. Thus for every
subject j 2 e¢ he can be classi¯ed in one an only one of the subsets !k with 1 · k · K
7. we construct a set of automata ¡(e¢) = f¡1;¡2:::;¡Kg. All the automata in ¡ have the same
number of states. They only di®er in their probability vector P2. The vector of probability of
the automaton ¡k is computed as Pk(i) =
§j2!k¦j(i)
]!k for i = 1::n. The function ]!k returns the
number of subjects classi¯ed in the cluster !k.
The set of automata ¡(e¢) = f¡1;¡2:::;¡Kg, represents the behavior of all the subjects in an
experiment e¢. Every automaton ¡k represents a set of subjects with the same behavior.
8. For every subject j 2 e¢ we select his history of extensive decision hj and the automaton which
represent him ¡k where k is the automaton that capture the behavior of j. Formally k is such
that j 2 !k.
We simulate during 60 periods the automaton ¡k for anticipating the decision made by the agent
j along her history hj. This generates the prediction ^ hj The prediction is the result obtained
from the output function G 2 ¡k. The success rate is the proportion of correct prediction made
by the set of automata ¡(e¢) out of all the possible evasion decisions made by all the subjects in
e¢.
More precisely the success rate predicting the evasions of agent j as Âj is
Âj = 1 ¡
P60
t=1 j^ hj(t) ¡ hj(t)j
60
(3)
where j ¢ j is the absolute value function. The average value across all the subjects represented
by an automaton is its success ratio.
In the next section we will develop an example of our method for computing the success rate for a
given set ¡e¢
4.2 The basic hypothesis: a three state automaton
1. Suppose the following hypothesis H0 :The decision of evading depends on whether the subject
was audited or not in the previous period.
2. The automaton for representing this hypothesis is ¡H0 = fS;S0;P;§;¤;T;Gg and Figure 5
represents it.
2There is a di®erence between the probabilities ¦ y P. The probabilities ¦ are the empirical probabilities obtained
in the previous steps, whereas P is the vector of probability related to the output function of every automaton in ¡(e¢).
11S0






Figure 5: The three state automaton
The automaton has two states S = f0;1g and a start state S0. Thus, in order of representing
the hypothesis we require only three states: the 0 in S represents the state of not audited in the
previous period. The 1 in S represents the state of audited in the previous period.
The input alphabet of this automata is § = f0;1g, where the 0 means not audited and the 1
means audited.
The output alphabet is ¤ = f0;1g, where 0 means it will not evade and 1 means that in the next
move the subject will evade.
The transition function for all the states is de¯ned as follows T(S0;0) = 0;T(S0;1) = 1;T(0;0) =
0;T(0;1) = 1;T(1;0) = 0;T(1;1) = 1. The ¯rst parameter of the transition function represents
the current state of the automaton. The second parameter represents what was read from the
input. For instance, T(1;0) = 0 means that the automaton is in state 1, i.e. audited in the
previous period, and it reads the symbol 0, i.e. the subject was not audited in the current
period, the automaton change to the state 0, i.e. not audited in the previous period.
The output function is probabilistic and depends on the probability vector P. The values of the
probability vector P will be computed below.
3. we compute the vector of visited state V for the 15 subjects in the experiment ec1. For example,
the visited state vector of subject 1 in ec1 is V1 = f54;6;1g. Indeed, during the experiments
there are 6 audits. This is why subject 1 visited the state: not audited 54 times, the state audited
6 times and ¯nally the initial state S0 one time.
4. we compute the vector of evasion E for the 15 subjects in the same experiment ec1. For the
¯rst subject, the vector is E1 = f16;1;0g. This means that the subject 1 evaded 16 times when
he was in the state not audited, he evaded only one time when he was in the state audited and
¯nally the subject did not evade in the initial state.
12Table 1: Probability vectors of the automata ¡1 and ¡2 for ec1
State P1 P2
Initial State S0 1 0.4
Audited State "1" 1 0.44
Not Audited State "0" 1 0.25
5. we compute for all the subjects their probability vector ¦j for j = 1..15. For instance, the
probability vector for subject 1 is ¦1 = f0;2963;0;1667;0g.
6. using all the vectors ¦j for j = 1..15, and deciding K = 2, we divide using cluster techniques the
group of 15 subjects in two3. For instance in this case, the optimal partition of the subjects in
ec1 is given by ­ = f!1 = f3g;!2 = f1;2;4;5;6;7;8;9;10;11;12;13;14;15gg
7. now we build the two automata, ¡1 and ¡2 and their probabilities vectors are given by P1 =
f1;1;1g and P2 = f0:2564;0;4487;0;52g.
The automaton ¡1 represents the individual in the ¯rst cluster. The subject 3 has evaded in all
her decisions. The automaton ¡2 represents all the other individuals. According to its probability
vector P2 the subjects evade more when they were in the state of audited.
8. using both automata we generate the predictions ^ hj for j=1..15. Notice that for the subject
3 we simulate her predictions using ¡1 whereas for all the other subjects we use ¡2. Taking
into account that the simulations of the predictions have an stochastic component in the output
function, we run Monte Carlo experiment in this step.
The success ratio of the hypothesis H0 using two automata ¡ = f¡1;¡2g is 0.6328.
The probability P of every automata provide information about the behavior of the subjects rep-
resented by the set of automata ¡H0.
In the step number 7 we show the probabilities of evading by the two automata. The ¯rst automaton
represent a subject who evade all the time. This subject just kept evading independently of the
state where he was found. On the other hand, ¡2 represent the average behavior of the subjects
in the experiment ec1. Notice that the probability of evading after being audited is almost twice the
probability of evading if the subject was not audited. This is the bomb crater e®ect already mentioned.
In Figure 6 we present a complete exploration of the performance of the hypothesis H0 which is
represented with a three state automaton. The graph on the left has in the horizontal axis the number
of clusters or automata with di®erent probabilities, and in the vertical axis there is the success ratio of
the automata. We explore the performance from 1 to 15 automata in each experiment, and for all the
countries. Notice that more than ¯ve automata with di®erent probabilities the improvement in the
3The decision of the number of clusters is arbitrary
13Success Ratio of K Number of Automata Average Marginal Improve on Success Ratio











































































































































































State P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
Initial State S0 0 0.32 1 0 0.6
Audited State "1" 0.5 0.75 0.33 0.166 0
Not Audited State "0" 0.74 0.30 0.13 0.64 0
Representation 1 (0.06) 6 (0.4) 2 (0.13) 1 (0.06) 5 (0.33)
success ratio is negligible. Indeed the graph on the right shows that after ¯ve automata the marginal
improvement on the average success ratio is negligible.
The experiment ei5 is the experiment which obtain the highest success rate. In order to obtain
information from its performance we analyze its behavior with more detail. We run the analysis with
K = 5, or with ¯ve automata with di®erent probabilities which produces a success rate of 0:7455.
Table 2 shows the probabilities of each automaton together with its degree of representativeness,
i.e. how many subjects the automaton represents. Automata ¡2 and ¡5 have the highest degree of
representativeness. The former represents six subjects and the later ¯ve.
The group represented by ¡2 in the third column, shows the e®ect of the bomb crater e®ect and
the group represented by ¡5 are subject who no matter the state where they are, they pay all their
taxes.
The two subjects represented by ¡3 evade few times, however they behave according to the predic-
tion of the bomb crater e®ect.
4.3 Exploring hypothesis
Following once more to the brief theoretical introduction and looking to the data collected from the
experiments one can conclude that it might be the case that there is not such a thing as the best
hypothesis for explaining how subjects behave in every experiment.
14Table 3: Hypothesis that explain better the behavior of each experiments with K automata
Experiment Hypothesis Success Ratio (K) Clusters
ec1 Base Line, Group 1 H0 0.6931 3
ec2 Base Line, Group 2 H2 0.6644 3
ec3 Redistribution, g. 1 H0 0.6614 3
ec4 Redistribution, g. 2 H3 0.6660 3
ec5 Public Good, Group 1 H0 0.6455 3
ec6 Public Good, Group 2 H0 0.5752 3
ei1 Base Line, Group 1 H2 0.6557 3
ei2 Base Line, Group 2 H0 0.6686 3
ei3 Redistribution, g. 1 H0 0.6634 3
ei4 Redistribution, g. 2 H3 0.7549 5
ei5 Public Good, Group 1 H0 0.601 3
ei6 Public Good, Group 2 H0 0.6643 3
Using the available information, we propose a set of hypothesis and we explore how do they perfor-
mance at explaining the subjects behavior. In order to do that, we compute the success ratio obtained
for each hypothesis. The set of hypothesis that we use are,
H1: The decision of whether to evade or not depends on whether the agent was audited or not during
the previous period and if when he was audited he was caught evading.
H2: The decision of whether to evade or not depends on the whether the agent was audited or not
during the last two periods.
H3: The decision of whether to evade or not depends on whether the agent was audited or not during
the last two period and if when he was audited he was caught evading.
H4: The decision of whether to evade or not depends on the whether the agent was audited or not
during the last three periods.
H5: The decision of whether to evade or not depends on the whether the agent was audited or not
during the last fourth periods.
H6: The decision of whether to evade or not depends on the whether the agent was audited or not
during the last three periods and if when he was audited he was caught evading.
In Table 3 we present the experiments, the hypothesis that explain them better and the number of
clusters that we use for obtaining the success ratio.
The success of the hypothesis H0 suggest us that longer histories, in the sense of taking into account
the past of decisions, does not improve the success ratio of the automata.
Each automata representing the hypothesis in Table 3 characterize the behavior of the subjects
in the experiments. For the sake of space we explore with more detail experiment ei4, because we
15Table 4: Automata ¡H3 using K=5 clusters
t-2 t-1 x ¡1 ¡2 ¡3 ¡4 ¡5
0 0 0 0 0.1315 0.4 0.66 0.074
0 0 1 0 0.1398 0.1163 0.5644 0.4286
0 1 0 0 0.25 1.0 0 0.667
0 1 1 0 0.722 0.600 0.633 0.667
1 0 0 0 0.111 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0.4 0.667
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
5 3 1 5 1
obtained there the highest success rate predicting the evasion of the subjects. The hypothesis H3
require 8 states for representing it. We are interested in predicting the decision of evading at time t
therefore in Table 4 we represent the states in eight rows. A number one (zero) in the ¯rst column,
t-2, indicates that the subject was (not) audited two periods ago. A number one (zero) in the second
column, t-1, says that the subject was (not) audited one period ago. A number one (zero) in the third
column says that the last time that the subject was audited he was (not) caught evading.
The last ¯ve columns represent the empirical probability of evading in every state, for the four
di®erent groups. The last row has the representativeness of each of the ¯ve automata. For instance
automaton ¡5 represents only one subject.
The last two states, where the subject is audited in period t-1 and t-2 are never visited in our
experiments, and this is why all there values are zeros.
There are ¯ve subjects, represented by automaton ¡1 and they never evade. Automaton ¡4 de-
scribes subjects which likely they evade if they were caught the last time that they were audited. This
is even more probable if they were just caught in the previous period. Finally automaton ¡2 represent
subjects with low probability of evading. However, if they are caught evading, they with a probability
of 0.72 will evade in the next period. The subjects represented by ¡4 and ¡2 resemble the type of
behavior anticipated for the bomb crater e®ect.
5 Searching for the best automaton
In the previous section, we use automaton for characterizing the behavior of the subjects in the
simulations.
In this section we search for the best automaton, according to the success rate at predicting the
extensive behavior of all the subjects in ¥. In this section we are looking for only one automaton to
explain the behavior of subjects.
For accomplishing this goal we run the following three steps algorithm:
161. we propose a hypothesis H together with the automaton ¡H that describes it.
2. we select a set of experiments E µ ¥ which are the target group of our problem. Notice that if
we work with the subjects in experiment e¢, the set E = fe¢g. If we are interested at obtaining
only one automaton to explain the behavior of all the subjects in ¥, then E = ¥.
3. using an optimization algorithm we search for the values of the vector of probability P 2 ¡H
that maximize the success rate in E.
Every individual j 2 E has a history hj of evasions. Extensively the history might be represented
by a string of binary number hj = f1;0;1:::;0g, where the ¯rst 1 means that the subject evaded in the
¯rst period and the zero in the second position means that the subject did not evade in the second
period.
Given the automata ¡H with its the set or probabilities of evading P in every state s 2 S it is
possible to simulate for a subject j a prediction ^ hj of the decision of evading or not.
Given a set of target experiments E µ ¥, a behavioral hypothesis H, and the automaton ¡H










where Âj is the success ratio of the automaton ¡H predicting the decision of the subject j.
There are important di®erences between the techniques applied in the previous section and in this
one. The ¯rst technique helps in the characterization of agents behavior. The goal of that technique
is to realize what provide more information: having more states in the automata or having more
automata for discriminate behaviors.
The second technique, is aimed to obtain the automaton that predict better the behavior of the
subjects within the experiments and between di®erent groups. In this case we work out a criteria for
measuring the quality of an automaton and we look for the best automaton using an optimization
algorithm.
5.1 The three state automaton revisited
Suppose again the same hypothesis that we used in the previous section, H0 :The decision of evading
depends on whether the subject was audited or not in the previous period.
We use genetic algorithms for searching the optimal vector of probabilities P for every experiment
e 2 ¥. We present the results in Table 5.
17Table 5: Optimal Success Ratio and Probability Vector for ¡H0
Characteristica b e11 e12 e21 e22 e31 e32
Chile Success Ratio 0.6635 0.505 0.576 0.5478 0.526 0.611
Initial State S0 0.2 0.53 0.43 0.36 0.62 0.21
Audited State "1" 0.6631 0.361 0.0859 0.41 0.933 0.7793
Not Audited State "0" 0.022 0.80 0.0156 0.996 0.127 0.0166
Italy Success Ratio 0.555 0.52 0.699 0.739 0.5232 0.624
Initial State S0 0.96 0.21 0.63 0.11 0.231 0.14
Audited State "1" 0.95 0.821 0.717 0.168 0.1768 0.115
Not Audited State "0" 0.978 0.008 0.002 0.0117 0.124 0.6797
aWithin every country, the ¯rst row has the success ratio. The second, third and fourth row has the probability
of evading in each state.
bThe reference exy stands for experiment x, group y
The automaton capture di®erent behavioral patterns. There are six cases where the bomb crater
e®ect is captured by the optimal automaton; three cases for Chile fe11;e31;e32g and three for Italy
fe12;e21;e22g. There are two cases representing honest behavior, where the probability of evading in
both states is low; one for Chile, e21 and one for Italy e31. There are another three cases where the
subjects are more likely to evade when they were in the state of not audited; two for Chile fe12;e22g
and one for Italy e32 . And ¯nally there is one experiment where subjects evade systematically, and
this is in Italy e11.
Thus basically we can observe four di®erent behavioral patterns as consequence of optimizing the
probability vector of the automaton represented by the hypothesis H0. The most representative pattern
is the bomb crater e®ect.
5.2 Optimizing the Hypothesis
In this section we use the hypothesis H0 to H6 that we used before for searching the optimal automaton
for every experiment. We present in Table 6 the hypothesis with the best success ratio for each
experiment and group.
Two hypothesis, H0 and H1, obtain very good performance at anticipating the subjects decisions
in ten out of twelve cases. Both hypothesis are simple in the sense that the automata that represent
them require few states. Both automaton use only information from the previous period. This suggest
that the changes during the previous period are enough information for predicting subjects decisions
in almost all the experiments
5.3 Does it matter what happens during the ¯rst periods?
In the experimental design, every experiment has two groups. The di®erence between the two groups is
that subjects participating in the second group were audited at the very beginning of the experiment.
The goal of this design, is to obtain an answer to the question of whether individuals evade less when
18Table 6: Hypothesis that explain better the behavior of each experiments with one automaton
Experiment Hypothesis Success Ratio
ec1 Base Line, Group 1 H0 0.6711
ec2 Base Line, Group 2 H0 0.5674
ec3 Redistribution, g. 1 H1 0.5453
ec4 Redistribution, g. 2 H1 0.5904
ec5 Public Good, Group 1 H3 0.6614
ec6 Public Good, Group 2 H0 0.6059
ei1 Base Line, Group 1 H1 0.5967
ei2 Base Line, Group 2 H2 0.6956
ei3 Redistribution, g. 1 H0 0.5287
ei4 Redistribution, g. 2 H1 0.6008
ei5 Public Good, Group 1 H0 0.7384
ei6 Public Good, Group 2 H0 0.6708
they are audited at the very beginning of their live.
In order to check for this, we formulate three new hypothesis. This three new hypothesis distinguish
whether the subjects were audited or not at the beginning of the experiment.
H7 Subjects decision of evading depends on whether he was audited or not during the previous period
and if he was audited during the ¯rst ¯ve periods of the experiment he will reduce his probability
of evading.
H8 Subjects decision of evading depends on whether he was audited or not during the previous period
and if he was audited during the ¯rst ¯ve periods of the experiment he will reduce his probability
of evading. Moreover the decision of whether to evade or not depends on whether the agent was
caught or not the last time that he was audited.
H9 Subjects decision of evading at time t depends on whether he was audited or not during the two
previous period and if he was audited during the ¯rst ¯ve periods of the experiment he will
reduce his probability of evading.
With the new set of hypothesis, from H0 to H9 we search for the optimal automaton for anticipating
the decision of the subjects for the three experiments in every country. Notice that this time, we do
not distinguish between the groups in every experiment. The results are presented in Table 7.
In four experiments the new hypothesis outperform the previous set of hypothesis. This means
that there is an e®ect on auditing the subjects at the beginning of their life as taxpayers.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we use the Theory of Finite Automata for explaining the behavior of subjects in experi-
ments on tax evasion run in Chile and Italy. In every country there were 6 experiments with di®erent
19Table 7: Hypothesis that explain better the behavior of each experiments with one automaton
Experiment Hypothesis Success Ratio
ec1;c2 Base Line H7 0.5820
ec3;c4 Redistribution H8 0.5924
ec5;c6 Public Good H7 0.5615
ei1;i2 Base Line H8 0.5810
ei3;i4 Redistribution H0 0.7186
ei5;i6 Public Good H0 0.6048
designs. We are interested at the decisions made by the individuals about whether to evade or not.
Every automaton represent an hypothesis about how subjects make their decision about evasion.
We approached the experimental data using a Moore Automata with two di®erent goals. On the
one hand we try to identify classes of subjects behaviors within an experiment and on the other hand
we search for the automaton, within every experiment, with the highest success rate at predicting
subjects decisions.
Related to the ¯rst goal, we identify two patterns that explain more than 70% of subjects behav-
iors: there are subjects that never evade and subject that evade strategically. The subjects evading
strategically behave following the bomb crater e®ect mentioned in [1]. They mainly evade after they
have received a tax control. This strategic agent make up their mind to think that the probability of
receiving two tax control in a row is very low.
We also discover that a simple behavioral hypothesis explains a big proportion of subject decisions.
Indeed, if we move into more complex hypothesis the success rate is lower than simple ones. The
complexity in this case is de¯ned by the number of states that an automaton require for capturing the
hypothesis: more complexity means more states.
Related to the second goal, when we search for an automaton explaining the highest proportion of
subject decisions, the success ratio depends on the experiments and on the type of decisions made by
the agent within the experiments. When subjects in an experiment rarely decide to evade, it is easy
to anticipate their decisions. Thus, the success rate is high. When subjects decisions are less biased,
the success ratio decrease.
We showed that the Theory of Finite Automata might be an interesting tool for understanding
subjects behavior in the experiments. In future work we hope to integrate the knowledge developed
in this paper for simulating the behavior of economic agents.
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